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Abstract
We first review the existing theories on the efficiency implications of the various
regulations that protect creditors. We then empirically investigate the costs and benefits of
the strict protection of creditor rights. Building on the sample of 49 countries developed by
La Porta et al. (1998), we study the impact on debt volume, interest rates and default rates
of both an aggregate measure of the degree of protection of creditor rights and the efficiency
of the judicial system. We confirm previous results showing that an effective judicial
system is crucial for the development and optimal performance of the credit market. Yet, in
contrast to previous studies, we find no conclusive evidence on the sign and magnitude of
the effect of creditor rights protection on credit market efficiency. Instead, macroeconomic
stability appears to be crucial for the outgrowth of wide debt markets.
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1. Introduction
What are the efficiency implications of the various laws and regulations that protect creditor
rights? Many economists and legal experts argue that protecting creditor rights is crucial for
the development and optimal performance of the credit market (see La Porta et al., 1997
and 1998). These authors maintain that the primary economic function of the credit market
is to provide cheap funds, and that this function can only be accomplished when creditor
rights are protected and sanctions on non-performing debtors are enforced.
This orthodox view, however, can be disputed on several grounds. First, there are
important moral and distributional objections (which nonetheless are most often ignored by
economists). In this respect, debtor-oriented laws and regulations are usually advocated in
order to protect less-well-off households and small-business entrepreneurs from the harsh
consequences of default.  A second criticism states that while creditor-oriented laws may be
efficient ex ante, as the proponents of the orthodox view suggest, they are likely to create
severe inefficiencies ex post, that is, once the uncertainty embedded in the entrepreneur’s
investment project is resolved. (See Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991, among many others.)
This is because if creditors are protected against debtors’ default, they may have little
incentive to allow entrepreneurs to restructure financially in order to reorganize their
ventures, even when their investment projects should be permitted to continue as going
concerns. Also, unless debtors are discharged from their residual unpaid obligations at the
end of a bankruptcy procedure, their incentives to work or invest in new (creditworthy)
projects will be necessarily diminished. This suggests a trade-off in deciding what the
optimal protection of credit rights should be:
“Other things equal, the easier it is for a borrower to escape from its obligations
to pay interest and, ultimately, repay a loan, the more likely it is that creditors
will lose some of the money they lend, and so the less willing they will be to
extend credit. Less plentiful credit means less economic activity. Against this
should be set important benefits that can result from bankruptcy law, says
Lawrence Ausubel ... When someone is too deeply in debt, he may have little
incentive to work, or, at least, to do any work that is legal, as any income earned
will have to go to creditors. Free him from his debts and his incentives to work
(legally) are restored. In a sense, the right to go bust is an insurance policy
against financial disaster” (Economist 1998).
Some authors also dispute the ex ante efficiency properties of legal arrangements
that strongly protect creditors. For instance, Posner, in his now seminal book, The Economic
Analysis of the Law (1992, p. 400), argues that lenders may assume unjustified risks if
protected against default:
“Some [U.S.] states have generous household [bankruptcy] exemptions for
insolvent debtors, others chintzy ones. In the former states, the risk of
entrepreneurship is reduced because the cost of failure is less, but interest rates
are higher because default is more likely and the creditor’s position in the event
of default is weaker. And note that higher interest rates make default all the more
likely. Cutting the other way, however, is the fact that in the low-exemption
states lenders’ risk is less, which induces lenders to make more risky loans, i.e.,6
loans likelier to end in bankruptcy. It is therefore unclear whether there will be
more bankruptcies in the high-exemption states or in the low-exemption ones.”
(Italics added.)
It has also been noticed that mitigating the costs of failure to entrepreneurs is likely to raise
entrepreneurial incentives to take risk and effort. In this respect, some economists consider
that in a legal environment where creditor rights are strongly protected, forward-looking
agents with bright but somewhat adventurous ideas may find it unattractive to go into
business. This is believed to be the case in Europe. For example, The Economist (1997)
argues that the problem of insufficient creation of start-up companies “requires a shift in
Europe’s laws and attitudes towards bankruptcy. If you start a company in London or Paris
and go bust, you have just ruined your future. Do it in Silicon Valley, and you just
completed your entrepreneurial training.”
Manove and Padilla (1999) and Manove, Padilla and Pagano (1999) point out that
the credit market serves other economic functions beyond providing cheap credit. These
functions include: screening of projects along dimensions in which banks and other lenders
have superior expertise, insuring risk-averse entrepreneurs who face investment projects
with large idiosyncratic risks, and protecting overconfident entrepreneurs and households
from their impulsive but legitimate investment and purchasing decisions. These authors
show that because of market imperfections in the banking industry, the strict protection of
creditor rights may lead to market  equilibria in which cheap credit is inappropriately
emphasized over these other functions. They also show that regulatory restrictions on
collateral requirements and the protection of debtors in bankruptcy proceedings may redress
this imbalance and restore market efficiency ex ante.
      It is important to make clear that none of these critical theories questions the need
for an efficient judicial system that effectively enforces existing laws and regulations,
whatever their nature and content. They all reckon that, in the absence of such a judicial
system, economic activity would be seriously hampered by all sorts of opportunistic
behavior. What theses theories dispute is the statement that creditor-oriented laws and
regulations constitute a prerequisite for the efficient performance of the credit market.
In this paper, we present the existing theories on the efficiency implications of the
various regulations that protect creditors, and review the empirical literature dealing with
this issue (Sections 2 and 3, respectively). The main bulk of the paper is devoted to the
empirical investigation of the costs and benefits of the strict protection of creditor rights
(Section 4). For this purpose, we build on the sample of 49 countries developed by La Porta
et al. (1998) by introducing some new variables. We use this sample to study the impact on
debt volume, interest rates and default rates of both an aggregate measure of the degree of
protection of creditor rights and the efficiency of the judicial system. We confirm previous
results by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) showing that an effective judicial system is crucial
for the development and optimal performance of the credit market. Yet, in contrast to
previous studies, we find no conclusive evidence on the sign and magnitude of the effect of
creditor rights protection on credit market efficiency. Our empirical analysis uncovers the
great importance of macroeconomic stability for credit market performance. In particular,
we find that countries with lower inflation have wider debt markets.
Although this paper focuses on the legal prerequisites for the development of credit
markets, our conclusions have far wider economic implications. In a recent paper, Rajan
and Zingales (1998) show, for a large sample of countries, how industrial sectors requiring7
external finance develop much faster in countries with well-functioning financial markets.
This article reveals the existence of a fundamental link between the development of the
credit system and the growth potential of a given country. Consequently, it seems crucial to
determine what legal institutions best contribute to the development of wide and  well-
performing credit markets in order to foster economic growth around the world.
2. Creditor Rights and Economic Efficiency: The Theory
A credit relationship usually involves three parties: a lender who provides the funds, a
borrower who invests these funds and promises to pay principal plus interest, and the courts
of law that enforce the loan contract in case of dispute between the lender and the borrower.
Inasmuch as the borrower may put the lender’s funds to a better (more productive or simply
more personally rewarding) use, lender and borrower have a common interest: they both
wish to share the gains from trading with each other. Yet, they are likely to disagree about
the price and amount of the loan, i.e., on how to split those gains from trade. Furthermore,
they are also likely to hold different views on how the loaned funds should be invested, as
well as on how to proceed in the event of default.  These conflicting views result from the
borrower’s ability to behave opportunistically (e.g., taking excessive risks, behaving
negligently, or just plainly diverting the funds to his own pocket), thus depriving the lender
of an adequate return on his investment.
These conflicts may be severe enough to prevent the extension of credit and,
consequently, the realization of the gains from trade. The courts of justice may help to
remedy this problem by punishing opportunistic behavior. For instance, no lender would
ever consider funding a borrower unless there is a third party (usually, the courts of justice)
effectively enforcing repayment. In the absence of such third party, the borrower would
simply refuse to repay and the lender would have no option but to afford losses.
1 It is true
that loan contracts often include collateral requirements whose main aim is to protect
lenders against the consequences of default by the borrower. But again, these collateral
requirements are effective only if there is a third party who stands ready to protect and
enforce the creditor’s right to foreclose any posted collateral in the event of default.
Therefore, the existence of a third party who performs this enforcement role is instrumental
for the development of the credit market. The greater the efficiency and predictability of the
third party’s actions and proceedings, the easier it is for lenders and borrowers to realize
their potential gains from trade. Consequently, we should expect to find a more widespread
use of external finance, and in particular debt, in countries with more efficient judicial
systems, where contracts are effectively enforced.
As Hart (1995) points out, in any lending relationship involving a single lender and
a single borrower, the courts of justice should simply ensure that the terms of the loan
contract are upheld. That is, they just need to enforce repayment in no default states and the
transfer of ownership and control upon default. Instead, when there are multiple creditors,
the role of the legal and judicial system becomes more complicated. The problem is that,
when the debtor cannot fully repay his debts, his lenders may engage in a socially inefficient
race to repossess their collateral or to foreclose the debtor’s assets through a court’s
judgement. This race may lead to the separate liquidation of the borrower’s assets and to a
loss of value for the creditors when these assets are worth more as a whole. Thus, in the
                                                       
1 Obviously, the creditor could do his own enforcement. This is precisely what the Mafia does to sustain
its lending activity. But, private enforcement involves important private costs and substantial social
distortions, which makes it in general an inferior alternative to public enforcement.8
presence of multiple creditors, the legal system must provide a (bankruptcy) procedure to
dispose of the borrower’s assets in an orderly and value-maximizing manner.
2 Bankruptcy
law, as well as various other credit regulations, can be understood as standard contracts
provided by the State, which largely determine the extent of legal protection enjoyed by
creditors within the lending relationship.
La Porta et al. (1998) show that there are many differences among countries in their
bankruptcy laws and credit regulations. Consequently, the degree of protection of creditor
rights exhibits a great deal of variation across countries. In most countries, collateral
requirements and restrictive loan covenants are legally feasible. Yet, some countries have
important collateral limitations, bankruptcy exemptions and discharge provisions built into
their bankruptcy codes, while others do not. For example, in the U.S., “fresh-start”
provisions in the 1978 Bankruptcy Code mandate the discharge of all debts remaining at the
conclusion of bankruptcy proceedings. This is not true in Spain and many other European
countries. Also, while in some countries “absolute priority rules,” which state that a senior
creditor is entitled to be paid in full before junior creditors and equityholders get anything,
are respected, in others important deviations do occur. Finally, the enforcement of creditor
rights also varies across countries. For instance, in some countries court-supervised auctions
of repossessed assets are manipulated by colluding  mafias or, even worse, are run by
corrupt officials. The value of collateral in these countries is, consequently, substantially
reduced.
Given all these differences, the question arises as to what constitutes the best
practice in this respect. More precisely, what is the optimal extent of protection of creditor
rights? The rest of this Section is devoted to reviewing the benefits and costs associated
with the strict protection of creditor rights.
2.1. The Benefits of the Strict Protection of Creditor Rights: The Orthodox View
A well-established strand of the literature sustains that investor protection is central to the
development of capital markets. In particular, this literature argues that credit would not be
extended if creditors were not legally entitled to repossess collateral:
“... [C]reditors are paid because they have the right to repossess collateral.
Without these rights, investors would not be paid, and therefore firms would not
have the benefit of raising funds from these investors” (La Porta et al., 1998).
This orthodox view originates from the idea that adverse selection and moral hazard
are the main problems in credit relationships. Let us briefly consider these two problems in
order. The credit market operates under substantial asymmetries of information. Indeed,
when a borrower applies for a loan, the lender most likely does not know many personal
and professional features of the borrower that may be crucial for an appropriate risk
assessment. For example, the borrower may either be an honest entrepreneur with a
creditworthy investment project or a crook whose only intention is to take the money and
run. The lender may understand that he may face one of these two types, but he cannot
determine with precision the exact type of a given borrower. This problem is only severe if,
in addition, the lender cannot observe (or, is not able to verify in front of a court of law) the
cause of default. Honest entrepreneurs repay their debts unless, due to bad luck, their
                                                       
2 Posner (1992) and Hart (1995) discuss several reasons why, in a world of costly contracting, this
bankruptcy procedure is best provided by the State rather than by the parties themselves.9
investment projects do not yield the expected returns. Crooks never repay. The dilemma for
creditors in this story is that they cannot assert whether default is fraudulent or not.
Suppose that the loan contract can only specify an interest rate, that is, assume that
the lenders cannot impose collateral requirements. Due to the lender’s inability to
discriminate between honest entrepreneurs and crooks, the equilibrium interest rate will
have to be set at a sufficiently high level to compensate for the risk of lending to a crook.
But, while a crook is willing to borrow at any interest rate, an honest entrepreneur’s demand
for credit decreases as the loan’s interest rate rises. The crook does not intend to pay the
loan in any case, which explains why his demand is not sensitive to price. Instead, the
honest entrepreneur will borrow only at interest rates for which his investment project has a
positive NPV. Consequently, high interest rates due to asymmetric information may end up
excluding the honest entrepreneur from the credit market. This phenomenon is known as
adverse selection. (See Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981.) Note that, if this were the case, the market
outcome would be highly inefficient, since the investment project of the honest entrepreneur
would not be funded despite its positive NPV. In this example, adverse selection produces
market collapse. The only borrower who is willing to apply for a loan at the prevailing rates
has no intention to repay. The lender who understands these incentives will not lend to
anyone in equilibrium.
In a credit market with asymmetric information, it may be optimal to allow the
parties to write contracts specifying collateral requirements, so lenders can appropriate the
collateralized assets in the event of default. The wealth of an entrepreneur is easily
observable, unlike his intentions or luck. An honest entrepreneur with a positive NPV
project will be more willing to post collateral in order to obtain a sufficiently low interest
rate than a crook, who has no investment project available and, consequently, will lose any
collateral offered. Hence, a borrower’s willingness to post collateral can convey useful
information concerning his type. Bester (1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987a and 1987b),
and Chan and Thakor (1987) show that this information can improve the allocation of credit
in equilibrium, tempering the problems created by adverse selection. Lenders can
discriminate among different borrowers’ types by offering a menu of contracts: each
contract specifies an interest repayment and a collateral requirement. A contract specifying
a large collateral requirement will also include a lower interest rate and vice versa.
Entrepreneurs with safer projects (such as our honest entrepreneur) will post collateral and
obtain lower interest rates.
Another benefit of collateral requirements is to mitigate moral hazard problems on
the debtor’s side. Borrowers have the incentive to engage in opportunistic behavior at their
creditors’ expenses. These problems are due to the lenders’ inability to supervise the
borrowers’ actions that affect the value of the loan. The borrower may, for instance, invest
the funds in a project that does not coincide with the original project presented for approval.
If the new project is riskier, then the interest rate specified in the original contract does not
adequately compensate the lender for the additional credit risk. The lender would like to
punish this deviant behavior, but such punishment is not feasible unless the diversion of
funds is both observable by the lender and verifiable in a court of law. Asset substitution is
not the only example of borrowers’ opportunistic behavior; other examples are the
undersupply of effort in the management of the project, the debt overhang or
underinvestment problem, or outright fraud.10
The right to repossess collateral gives lenders an essential threat to ensure that
borrowers will not behave in this way.
3 The reason is that opportunistic actions make the
borrower’s default as well as the repossession of collateralized assets more likely. This
raises the cost of value-reducing deviant behavior and, thus, reduces the incentives to
undertake such actions. In short, the borrower risks his own money and not only the funds
lent by creditors. If creditors do not have the right to require collateral or cannot effectively
repossess collateralized assets, interest rates will rise in response to these agency problems
and, if that is not enough to cover the opportunity cost of lending, the credit market may
even collapse. The strict protection of the creditor’s right to repossess collateral leads to
cheaper credit. Consequently, many valuable investment projects, which would not be
funded because of moral hazard problems, can be financed when the debtor is allowed to
commit his own wealth to the repayment of his debts.
So far, we have presented several arguments supporting the claim that the strict
protection of creditor rights raises the efficiency of the credit market ex ante. We shall now
briefly consider the same issue but from an ex post viewpoint, i.e., once the uncertainty
embedded in the investment project is resolved. Suppose that the borrower defaults in his
promise to repay at maturity. There are two possible courses of action: either the assets
comprising the investment project are sold and the liquidation value is used to repay the
creditors, or else an agreement is reached and the project is continued as an ongoing
concern. Liquidation is efficient if the liquidation value of the assets exceeds the value of
the project as an ongoing concern. Yet, if the bankruptcy procedure allows the borrower to
file for reorganization without the creditors’ consent, keeping the administration of his
property during the reorganization process, and imposes an automatic stay on the assets of
the firm upon reorganization, liquidation may not take place even when it is efficient. This
is allegedly the case in the U.S. and may other countries, such as Spain. The strict protection
of the creditors’ right to repossess collateral and to be repaid according to absolute priority
rules eliminates this ex post overinvestment problem (see Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991).
2.2. The Cost of the Strict Protection of Creditor Rights: Critical Theories
On the other hand, credit-oriented regulations may lead to underinvestment ex post. This is
because if creditors are strongly protected in case of default, they will have no incentive to
allow their debtors to restructure financially and continue their investment projects. Thus,
the debtors’ assets may be liquidated even when efficiency would require keeping them in
the hands of debtors as part of their ongoing investment projects.
The ex ante efficiency of pro creditor laws can also be disputed. First, these laws
limit the incentives of entrepreneurs to take risks. Consequently, creditworthy projects may
not be funded in equilibrium. To illustrate this point, let us consider the two following
scenarios. In the first case, an entrepreneur obtains funds for his (fixed-size) investment
project at a given interest factor R0, but he is not required to post any assets as collateral for
his loan. The entrepreneur’s liability is thus limited: his promise is to repay principal plus
interest from the proceedings of his investment project. In a competitive credit market, R0
will be equal to R/p in equilibrium, where p is the probability of repayment and R the
opportunity cost of funds for the lender. Hence, if the project is successful, the entrepreneur
                                                       
3 The right to repossess collateral is the most fundamental right awarded to creditors. Most other rights
are intimately related to or even derived from it. Among others, we can cite the right to introduce
restrictive covenants into the loan contract, the right to veto the reorganization of bankrupt firms, the
right to gain possession of their security during such reorganizations, and the right to be repaid according
to their absolute priority in the event of bankruptcy.11
earns the project’s returns minus R0. If, instead, the project fails, the entrepreneur does not
lose anything.
In the second scenario, the entrepreneur posts his house as collateral for his loan. In
this situation, the risk borne by the lenders is less, since in the event of default by the
entrepreneur they can repossess his house and liquidate it in order to recover their funds.
Consequently, the lenders will be willing to fund the entrepreneur’s investment project at a
lower interest factor. In a competitive credit market, the total cost of funds for the
entrepreneur (which includes the pecuniary cost associated with the potential loss of his
house) is the same in the two scenarios being considered. Yet, the risk borne by the
entrepreneur is greater in the second scenario. In this last case, the entrepreneur earns a
larger profit when the project succeeds, since he must pay a lower interest factor. But, if the
project ends in a fiasco, the entrepreneur loses his house. Therefore, if the entrepreneur is
risk-averse, his incentives to invest are reduced in the second scenario.
In summary, a pro-creditor bias in bankruptcy law may act as a barrier for the entry
of new businesses. This problem is particularly severe, since as pointed out by Arrow
(1962), in a society where individuals are risk-averse and in the absence of adequate
mechanisms to diversify risk, investment in risky but highly rewarding activities is
suboptimal, even when there is no pro-creditor bias in the credit regulations. Furthermore,
Carr and Mathewson (1988) show that unlimited liability rules constitute barriers to entry
even in the absence of risk aversion. This is because unlimited liability generates a moral
hazard problem stemming from the ability of some shareholders to free ride on the wealth
of others, who provide the guarantee of additional payments to cover insolvencies.
Creditor-oriented lending laws may generate other ex ante inefficiencies. Bebchuk
and Piker (1998) have pointed out that deviations from absolute priority raise the incentives
of owner-managers to make investments in managerial human capital and reduce their
incentives to entrench themselves as managers by choosing projects for which their input is
essential. Likewise, Berkovitch, Ronen and Zender (1997) argue that in deciding about an
optimal bankruptcy law, the legislator must take into account the ex ante incentives of
managers to invest in firm-specific human capital. Deviations from absolute priority might
also discourage excessive risk-taking in financial distress prior to filing for bankruptcy (see
Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991) and facilitate the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings when
such initiation is desirable (see Baird, 1991). Finally, Bebchuk and Fried (1996, p. 857)
argue that “a borrower and a secured creditor may have incentives under full priority to
expend resources inefficiently encumbering an asset merely to transfer value from non-
adjusting creditors.” These “non-adjusting” creditors include tort claimants, government tax
and regulatory agencies, and voluntary creditors with small claims as well as voluntary
creditors with large but fixed claims.
As we discussed above, one of the main rationales in support of pro-creditor laws is
that they lead to a reduction in the cost of capital. Yet, the credit market can serve other
important economic functions. Among others, these functions include project screening,
insuring risk-averse individuals, and protecting society from overconfidence. Manove and
Padilla (1999), and  Manove,  Padilla and  Pagano (1999) show that, when collateral
requirements are enforceable, competition among lenders leads to lower interest rates, but
that, because of several credit market imperfections (arising from asymmetric information
or bounded rationality), creditors will not pay due emphasis to their other economic
functions.12
Jackson (1986) argues that lenders, such as banks, may be more capable than
entrepreneurs of assessing the performance of potential investment projects. This is because
banks acquire valuable information in the course of dealing with entrepreneurs so that they
can develop useful yardsticks with respect to which new projects can be evaluated. Banks
also have superior sectoral and cyclical information and can better predict the impact of
wide macroeconomic trends on the profitability of specific investment projects. Banks are,
or ought to be, in the project-evaluation business. Yet, a high level of collateral will weaken
a bank’s incentive to do so. For instance, if the loan is fully collateralized, the bank is not
exposed to default risk and, therefore, it is indifferent as to the nature of the investment
project that is financed with its funds. Jackson (1986, p. 249) stresses that
“Discharge … heightens creditors’ incentives to monitor: by providing for a right of
discharge, society enlists creditors in the effort to oversee the individual’s credit
decisions.”\.
Jackson makes clear that this incentive problem on the creditors’ side is most
important when the social security or some other “safety net” insures borrowers. This is
because in such a case borrowers will have an incentive to undertake excessively risky
projects while banks will have no incentive to restrain them because of the protection
awarded by collateral.
“If there were no right of discharge, an individual who lost his assets to creditors
might rely instead on social welfare programs. The existence of those programs might
induce him to underestimate the true cost of his decisions to borrow. In contrast,
discharge imposes much of the risk of ill-advised credit decisions, not on social
insurance programs, but on creditors. The availability of an unlimited non-waivable
right of discharge in bankruptcy therefore encourages creditors to police extensions of
credit and thus minimizes the moral hazard created to safety-net programs. Because
creditors can monitor debtors and are free to grant or withhold credit, the discharge
system contains a built-in checking mechanism. The importance of encouraging
creditor monitoring in a society that provides other safety nets may explain why the
right of discharge is not waivable” (Jackson, 1986).
Manove, Padilla and Pagano (1999) develop a formal equilibrium model that allows
us to evaluate the robustness of Jackson’s arguments once all market interactions are taken
into account. In this model, entrepreneurs have privileged information on their respective
ability to develop profitable investment projects. Entrepreneurs differ in this ability: some
are more able than others in identifying valuable investment projects. Banks know that
entrepreneurs differ along this dimension, but cannot distinguish among types when
confronted with a given borrower. Entrepreneurs, irrespective of their types, may end up
with a bad project. Consequently, the ex ante screening of investment projects adds value to
all entrepreneurs, even to capable ones. The authors, following Jackson, assume that banks
have an advantage in project evaluation, so that from a social standpoint this activity should
be undertaken by banks.
Entrepreneurs must obtain loans from banks to invest. Banks can discover the
quality of a given project by screening it at a cost. Screening is non-observable and non-
contractible. Therefore, banks will only screen projects as part of a loan approval procedure
when the direct benefit to the bank of the information obtained exceeds the screening cost.
Entrepreneurs whose loan applications are approved pay not only their own screening costs,
but also a prorated share of the screening costs of those applicants whose loans are denied.13
Banks with fully collateralized loans have no incentive to screen. If a bank screens, then it
will only approve the loan if it is found to be good.
In this setting, because of entrepreneurial heterogeneity, banks would like to be able
to introduce collateral requirements into their loan contracts in order to discriminate among
entrepreneurial types, as well as to protect themselves against default risk. But, as we have
just noted, collateral reduces their incentives to screen projects prior to loan approval.
Suppose that screening costs are not too high, so that screening is socially efficient for all
entrepreneurs. In any competitive pooling equilibrium, in which no entrepreneur posts
collateral, all projects are screened and thus only good projects will be funded. In this
equilibrium, no entrepreneurs of either type will default. However, able entrepreneurs will
pay a share of the screening costs from approved loans not only of able applicants but of
less-able entrepreneurs as well. Because the latter’s costs are higher, since less-able
entrepreneurs are more likely to have bad projects, able entrepreneurs have an incentive to
separate by posting sufficient collateral. But this in turn removes the incentives of banks to
screen. Manove, Padilla and Pagano (1999) show that, for an intermediate range of the
screening costs, banks underinvest in project evaluation. Too many unworthy projects are
funded and too many creditworthy entrepreneurs experience bankruptcy. This inefficiency
can be partially corrected via collateral limitations, bankruptcy exemptions or discharge
provisions.
A somewhat related argument is made by Bebchuk and Fried (1996), who claim “to
the extent that the bank is insulated by a security interest from the effects of the borrower’s
misbehavior, the bank will have less incentive to control the borrower’s behavior.” This
paper, however, differs from Manove, Padilla and Pagano (1999) in two respects. First, it
focuses on ex post monitoring rather than ex ante screening. Second, and most importantly,
in this paper the inefficiencies associated with the creation of a security interest originate in
the existence of creditors who cannot adjust their claims to take into account that any
security interest subordinates their unsecured claims.
Jackson (1986) identifies another reason why limiting creditor rights may be value-
increasing. He claims that these policy measures may help to correct possible psychological
biases that affect individual investment and consumption choices. That is, they may
contribute to limit the harmful decisions of individuals acting under misperceptions or in an
impulsive and irrational manner. Jackson points out that many economic agents process
available information in such a way that they consistently underestimate future risks. In the
words of Adam Smith:
“The overweening conceit which the greater part of men have of their abilities is an
ancient evil remarked by the philosophers and moralists of all ages. Their absurd
presumption in their own good fortune has been less taken notice of [but is], if
possible, still more universal … The chance of gain is by every man more or less
overvalued, and the chance of loss is by most men undervalued” (Adam Smith, The
Wealth of Nations, Book I, Chapter X).
The available empirical evidence seems to support these statements. De Bondt and
Thaler (1995, p. 389), in a survey paper reviewing a large number of studies on behavioral
economics written by economists, psychologists and sociologists, report “perhaps the most
robust finding in the psychology of judgment is that people are overconfident.” That is,
people are unrealistically optimistic about their ability, power and the outcome of their own14
actions. Psychologist Shelley E. Taylor (1989) concludes that the most important lesson
from the existing evidence is that optimism is an essential characteristic of the healthy mind.
Because individuals entertain optimistic expectations about the future, many of their
decisions in an uncertain context may not really reflect their “true” subjective preferences
for consumption or investment, on the one hand, and savings, on the other. This discrepancy
between an individual’s “revealed” preferences and his “true” preferences has its origins in
the individual decision process, which is corrupted by misperceptions of whose existence
the individual is completely unaware.
Jackson considers that this psychological bias justifies the enactment of non-
waivable collateral limitations. In the absence of such limits, overconfident entrepreneurs
will commit large parts of their wealth to obtain loans at a lower cost. Optimistic
entrepreneurs underestimate the likelihood of bankruptcy and, hence, the opportunity cost
of collateral. Because of their optimism, these entrepreneurs would waive any discretional
protection, which explains why collateral limitations have to be non-waivable if we want
them to be effective.
Many would argue that this position is highly paternalistic. This is true. Jackson
considers that optimism does not constitute an excuse from the loyal fulfillment of one’s
obligations. But for the very same reason, he sustains that we must limit the choice of
optimists in order to protect them against their own mistakes and to prevent their
exploitation by individuals with superior information. This paternalistic intervention does
not contradict the main tenets of economic and philosophic liberalism since, as pointed out
by Feinberg (1986) and Trebilcok (1993), any choice based on ignorance or misperception
is not truly free.
One may object that a paternalistic intervention is not actually needed because the
market has a large number of institutions for dealing with overconfidence and excessive
boldness among entrepreneurs. Indeed, banks and other lending institutions serve as a first
line of defense. However, Manove and Padilla (1999) show that a competitive credit market
does not afford enough protection against entrepreneurial optimism.
Entrepreneurial optimism generates two different kinds of distortions from a social
viewpoint. First, optimists invest their borrowed funds in projects with a return below the
social cost of funds. Society as a whole would be better off if those funds had been invested
in alternative uses. Second, optimists may have less risky (and therefore less subject to their
optimistic expectations), creditworthy alternatives, which they incorrectly tend to disregard.
Society would be better off if they invested any borrowed funds in these safer, albeit less
glamorous, projects.
Banks do internalize the opportunity cost of the funds lent when fixing the interest
rates for their loans. That is, they raise the rates charged to ensure a sufficient return in their
lending activities. In this way, they solve the first distortion generated by optimism. Yet,
they do not cope with the second distortion. Competitive banks fail to appropriate the
surplus that would accrue if the entrepreneur would invest in safer alternatives. Hence,
interest rates do not incorporate this opportunity cost and, consequently, the optimistic
entrepreneur also neglects it. This outcome is due to the competitive nature of the credit
market, which in effect induces banks to maximize the entrepreneurs’ “perceived”
preferences, as well as to the inability of the latter to figure out that they are subject to
unrealistic expectations.15
Manove and Padilla show that if banks can require collateral to protect themselves
from non-performing loans, the resulting lower interest rates may serve only to encourage the
already overconfident entrepreneurs. That is, collateral requirements, which are efficient in
other settings, are inefficient in this case. To sum up, Manove and Padilla provide a formal
justification to the kind of paternalistic intervention suggested by Jackson, by showing that
solving the distortions generated by entrepreneurial optimism cannot be left to private
contracting.
2.3. A Brief Summary
In the last two subsections we have reviewed a number of theories on the optimal degree of
protection of creditor rights. Our purpose now is to summarize their main implications
regarding some direct, though not fully comprehensive, measures of credit market
performance. These measures are lending volume, interest rates and default rates.
The orthodox view suggests that the strict protection of creditor rights will lead to
cheaper credit because of the protection conferred to lenders and also because, by forcing
entrepreneurs to risk their own wealth, they provide entrepreneurs with the right incentives
to perform. The reduced cost of funds will in turn lead to increased lending volumes and
investment levels, and to a reduction in the proportion of defaulted loans and insolvent
enterprises.
The critical theories surveyed in Section 2.2 also predict lower interest rates in
response to a stricter prediction of creditor rights. But, in contrast to the orthodox view, they
predict a larger proportion of defaulted loans and insolvent businesses. Too many unworthy
projects are funded when creditors are protected against default, because creditors’
incentives to screen projects and to discourage investment by overconfident entrepreneurs
are reduced as default risk falls. The prediction regarding lending volume is mixed. On the
one hand, cheaper funds should lead to larger lending volumes. This is a supply-side effect.
On the other hand, a pro-creditor bias in credit regulations may reduce the demand for
credit.
These predictions are summarized in the following table.16
Table 1
The impact of a stricter protection of creditor rights
Lending volume Interest rates Default rates
Orthodox view › ﬂ ﬂ
Critical theories ›ﬂ ﬂ ›
3. Creditor rights and economic efficiency: the evidence
It seems to us that, in order to evaluate the relative merits of these conflicting views of the
credit market, we need a number of empirical studies that seriously consider the actual
efficiency implications of protecting creditor rights. Unfortunately, there are few of them
available to us so far.
In a pair of excellent papers, La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998) have empirically
analyzed for a large set of 49 countries the relationship between the strength of protection of
creditor rights and the efficiency of the judicial system, on one side, and lending volumes,
on the other. They show how countries with a more efficient judicial system and a greater
respect for the law enjoy greater lending volumes.
They also show that common-law countries, such as the U.S., the U.K. and Japan,
give better protection to creditors and have wider debt markets than civil law countries, such
as France, Germany, Italy and Spain. We must qualify these last statements, though,
because there are important differences within each legal family. For instance, among
common-law countries, the U.K. awards maximal protection to creditors whereas the U.S.
bankruptcy code has a marked pro-debtor bias. Among those countries whose law is
classified within the French civil law family, there are also substantial differences. For
example, the degree of protection awarded to creditors in Spain is similar to that prevailing
in Scandinavian countries and not significantly inferior to that in countries classified within
the German civil law tradition. In contrast, France has a minimal degree of creditor
protection, according to the index developed by La Porta et al. Yet, this cannot be attributed
to the Napoleonic tradition that defines what we tend to denominate as French civil law.
The Napoleonic Commercial Code of 1807 treated debtors as criminals, even if default was
not fraudulent, and focused mainly on the repayment of unpaid debts. France reformed its
bankruptcy law in 1984, which became the most biased towards debtors of those in place in
1994 (see Espina, 1997).
The positive relationship between lending volume and the degree of protection of
creditor rights is also found by Gropp, Scholz and White (1997). They analyze, using U.S.
data, how cross-state differences in personal bankruptcy rules affect the amount of credit
available to low-asset households. They conclude that, somewhat ironically, bankruptcy
exemptions divert credit towards relatively wealthier households.17
The finding of La Porta et al. (1997) that more effective judicial systems sustain
wider credit markets has also been confirmed by several other studies. Freixas (1991) shows
how in Europe both the average cost as well as the duration of the judicial process required
to repossess collateralized assets are inversely related to the amount of funds available to
finance consumption and housing acquisitions.  Meador (1982) and  Jaffee (1985) have
found evidence that interest rates also respond to the efficiency of the judicial system. They
find that interest rates in the U.S. mortgage market are higher in those states where the cost
and duration of judicial interventions to repossess collateral are higher. Similar results have
been found by Alston (1984). Lastly, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998a) show that,
in countries whose legal systems score high on an efficiency index, a greater proportion of
firms use long-term external financing.
Finally, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998b) show that most creditor rights are
not significantly related to the debt composition decisions of large firms. The only
exception is the right to seize collateral after default; this right is associated with a
significantly shorter maturity of debt for large firms. Interestingly, this right is not similarly
correlated with the financing decisions of small firms. In short, these authors have not been
able to consistently relate specific investor protections with firm financing.
Broadly speaking, the existing studies have focused on the impact of creditor rights
protection on lending volume.
4 They show that the relationship between these two variables
is negative and statistically significant. But, as we discussed in Section 2.3, this is not
enough to evaluate the relative merits of the different theories that study the effects of
creditor rights protection. To properly discriminate among then, we should consider other
measures of credit market performance, such as default rates. This is one of the aims of the
following Section.
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4. Another Look at the Effects of a Stricter Protection of Creditor Rights
In this Section, we revisit the analysis by La Porta et al. (1997) on the legal determinants of
debt finance. We first reconsider their cross-country investigation of the impact of creditor
rights on debt volume by introducing some additional macroeconomic controls of great
theoretical relevance. We then proceed to study how creditor rights affect real interest rates
and default rates for their sample of 49 countries.
4.1. Data
We build on the sample developed and firstly used by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998). We
introduce two new dependent variables (the default rate and the real interest rate) and two
new explanatory variables (inflation and government surplus). Table 2 presents the
description of the variables used in our analysis, the data we use and their sources.
As in La Porta et al. (1997), we measure the overall ability of the private sector to
access debt finance through the ratio of the sum of the bank debt of the private sector and
the face value of corporate bonds to GNP in each country. The real interest rate is measured,
                                                       
4 A survey of this literature can be found in La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1998).
5 No study has so far established a positive relationship between the filing rate and the generosity of the
state property exemptions. For instance Domowitz and Eovaldi (1993) conclude that the 1978 pro debtor
amendment of the US Bankruptcy Code cannot be established as the cause of the increase in the number
of non-business bankruptcies that took place in the early 1980s. Business cycle conditions and
demographic trends seem to explain the bulk of the increase.18
as standard, as the real lending rate charged by banks on loans made to prime customers.
We use two different proxies for the default rate. First, we employ the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans in each country. Given that there are few available
observations for this variable, we also use the ratio of bank provisions for loan losses to total
loans in each country.
6 These last two variables are taken from the BankScope bank-level
data set published by IBCA.
Our macroeconomic controls include GDP growth and the logarithm of real GNP,
as in La Porta et al. (1997), plus two indicators of the government’s macroeconomic policy:
the inflation rate and the size of the government’s fiscal surplus (deficit). GDP growth is
included because of its likely impact on valuations and also because it may constitute an
appropriate indicator of the financing needs of firms. The log of real GNP is introduced
because larger economies may have larger credit markets simply as a result of economies of
scale.
7
The inflation rate and the size of the government’s fiscal surplus (deficit) provide
valuable indicators of the government’s management of the economy and of the stability of
the macroeconomic context within which firms operate in each country. The inflation rate
also indicates the extent to which the local currency provides a stable measure to be used in
debt contracts (Demirgüç-Kunt and Marksimovic, 1998b). Hence, a higher inflation rate
should negatively impact debt volume. The size of the government’s fiscal surplus affects
the amount and cost of funds available to the private sector. A larger (smaller) surplus
(deficit) improves the private sector’s access to debt finance.
Our measure of creditors’ protection is taken from La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998),
and is an aggregate index of the various credit rights in the liquidation and reorganization
procedures that follow after a borrower’s default. As an indicator of the efficiency of the
legal system in each country, we use the variable rule of law, which is an assessment of the
law and order tradition in the country (see La Porta et al. 1997 and 1998). Table 3 contains
the raw data used in our analysis.
                                                       
6 Note that both variables may be subject to severe accounting problems and measurement errors. They
may be fundamentally driven by differences in banking regulatory practices across countries that lie
outside our control. Furthermore, the provision for loan losses ratio may be distorted by the discretionary
nature of these provisions.
7 See La Porta et al. (1997, p. 1137) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998b).19
Table 2
Description of the variables
Debt/GNP Ratio of the sum of bank debt of the private sector
and outstanding non-financial bonds to GNP in
1994, or last available. Source: La Porta  et al.
(1997).
Non-performing loans/total loans Ratio of total non-performing loans to total loans in
each country (1994-95 country average). This
variable is based on the  BankScope bank-level
data set by IBCA. Source: Jappelli and Pagano
(1998).
Bank provisions for loan losses/total loans Ratio of bank provisions for loan losses to total
loans in each country (1994-95 country average).
This variable is based on the  BankScope bank-
level data set produced by IBCA. Source: Jappelli
and Pagano (1998).
Real interest rate Real lending rate charged by the banks on loans to
prime customers in 1994. Inflation in 1994
(consumer price index) is used to compute real
interest rate. Source: The World Bank,  World
Development Report 1996  and United Nations,
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, XLIX, 1995.
GDP growth Average annual percent growth of per capita gross
domestic product for the period 1970-1993.
Source: La Porta et al. (1997).
Log GNP Logarithm of the Gross National Product in 1994.
Source: La Porta et al. (1997).
Inflation Inflation in 1994 (consumer price index). Source:
United Nations,  Monthly Bulletin of Statistics,
XLIX, 1995.
Government surplus (% GDP) Ratio of current and capital revenue and official
grants received, less total expenditure and lending
minus repayments to Gross Domestic Product in
1994. Source: The World Bank,  World
Development Report 1996.20
Table 2
Description of the variables (continued)
Rule of law Assessment of the law and order tradition in the
country. Average of the months of April and
October of the monthly index between 1982 and
1995. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores for less
tradition of law and order. La Porta et al. (1997).
Creditor rights An index aggregating creditor rights. The index is
formed by adding 1 when: (1) the country imposes
restrictions, such as creditors’ consent or minimum
dividends, to file for reorganization; (2) secured
creditors are able to gain possession of their
security once the reorganization petition has been
approved (no automatic stay); (3) the debtor does
not retain the administration of its property pending
the resolution of the reorganization; (4) secured
creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the
proceeds that result from the disposition of the
assets of a bankrupt firm. The index ranges from 0






























Australia 0.76 3.7 0.34 9.92 3.06 12.64 1.89 -2.9 10 1
Austria 0.79 (na) 0.9 (na) 2.74 12.13 3.05 -5.1 10 3
Belgium 0.38 (na) 0.26 6.84 2.46 12.29 2.4 -6.1 10 2
Canada 0.72 2.34 0.79 6.61 3.36 13.26 0.27 -4.5 10 1
Denmark 0.34 (na) 1.37 6.2 2.09 11.84 1.98 -5.7 10 3
Finland 0.75 3.3 2.51 6.74 2.4 11.49 1.09 -14.1 10 1
France 0.96 8.81 0.95 6.13 2.54 14.07 1.67 -5.5 8.98 0
Germany 1.12 (na) 0.6 8.54 2.6 14.46 2.73 -2.5 9.23 3
Greece 0.23 (na) 1.2 14.86 2.46 11.25 10.92 -15.6 6.18 1
Ireland 0.38 (na) (na) 3.7 4.25 10.73 2.31 -2.3 7.8 1
Italy 0.55 5.21 1.74 6.89 2.82 13.94 4.03 -10.6 8.33 2
Japan 1.22 1.66 0.53 3.42 4.13 15.18 0.66 -1.6 8.98 2
Mexico 
* 0.47 7.09 2.89 (na) 3.07 12.69 6.95 (na) 5.35 0
Netherlands 1.08 (na) 0.05 5.4 2.55 12.68 2.75 -0.5 10 2
New Zealand 0.9 (na) (na) 7.86 1.67 10.69 1.71 0.8 10 3
Norway 0.64 4.6 -0.06 6.91 3.43 11.62 1.39 -7.5 10 2
Portugal 0.64 5.56 1.56 9.25 3.52 11.41 5.26 -2.2 8.68 1
Spain 0.75 4.74 0.98 3.94 3.27 13.19 4.77 -4.8 7.8 2
Sweden 0.55 7.02 1.12 8.2 1.79 12.28 2.22 -13.4 10 2
Switzerland (na) (na) 0.75 4.58 1.18 12.44 0.88 (na) 10 1
Turkey 0.15 6.11 2.26 (na) 5.05 12.08 106.27 -4 5.18 2
UK 1.13 (na) 0.16 3.01 2.27 13.86 2.42 -6.6 8.57 4




* 0.19 (na) 3.79 5.68 1.4 12.4 4.18 (na) 5.35 1
Brazil 
* 0.39 6.31 3.63 (na) 3.95 13.03 2502.5 -4 6.32 1
Chile 
* 0.63 0.93 0.34 7.97 3.35 10.69 11.42 1.7 7.02 2
Colombia 
* 0.19 7.34 1.74 14.03 4.38 10.82 23.21 -0.6 2.08 0
Ecuador 
* (na) 4.64 1.99 13.09 4.55 9.49 27.33 0 6.67 4
Egypt (na) (na) 2.63 7.74 6.13 10.53 8.13 2.1 4.17 4
Hong Kong (na) (na) 0.28 (na) 7.57 11.56 8.08 (na) 8.22 4
India 0.29 (na) 3.87 5.41 4.34 12.5 10.33 -6 4.17 4
Indonesia 0.42 (na) 0.84 10.83 6.38 11.84 8.45 0.6 3.98 4
Israel 0.66 (na) 0.85 4.47 4.39 11.19 12.38 -3 4.82 4
Jordan 0.7 5.54 0.86 6.64 1.2 8.49 2.21 1.9 4.35 (na)
Kenya (na) (na) (na) (na) 4.79 8.83 29.04 -3.6 5.42 4
Malaysia 0.84 (na) 0.63 3.75 6.9 11 3.71 4.1 6.78 4
Nigeria (na) (na) (na) -23.25 3.43 10.36 57.01 (na) 2.73 4
Pakistan 0.27 (na) (na) (na) 5.5 10.88 12.47 -6.9 3.03 4
Peru 
* 0.27 8.93 3.45 24.14 2.82 10.92 23.73 3.1 2.5 0
Philippines 0.1 3.05 0.38 5.54 0.3 10.44 9.06 -1.4 2.73 0
Singapore 0.6 (na) (na) 2.31 1.68 11.68 3.51 15.7 8.57 3
South Africa 0.93 (na) 0.73 6.1 7.48 10.92 8.95 -9.2 4.42 422
Table 3a
Data (continued)
South Korea 0.74 (na) 0.79 (na) 9.52 12.73 (na) 0.3 5.35 3
Sri Lanka 0.25 (na) 0.83 4.2 4.04 9.28 8.45 -8.7 1.9 3
Taiwan (na) (na) 0.32 (na) 11.56 12.34 (na) (na) 8.52 2
Thailand 0.93 (na) 0.49 8.28 7.7 11.72 5.65 1.9 6.25 3
Uruguay 
* 0.26 3.52 1.47 34.78 1.96 9.4 44.75 -3 5 2
Venezuela 
* 0.1 (na) 8.11 -8.85 2.65 10.99 60.84 -4.3 6.37 (na)
Zimbabwe (na) (na) (na) 10.33 2.17 8.63 22.27 (na) 3.68 4
Notes: 
*  Latin American country; (na): not available.
4.2. Summary Statistics
Tables 4a and 4b present some useful summary statistics, while Table 5 contains the raw
correlations between our dependent and independent variables. As we can see from Table
4a, our sample contains substantial cross-sectional variability for each of the variables being
considered. To construct Table 4b, we have grouped countries according to two different
criteria. We first distinguish between OECD and non-OECD countries. Then, we separate
the Latin American countries from the rest. We interpret membership in the OECD as an









Debt/GNP 41 0.59 0.31 0.10 1.22
Non-performing
loans/total loans
21 4.86 2.28 0.93 8.93
Bank provisions for loan
losses/total loans
42 1.42 1.50 -0.06 8.11
Real interest rate 40 6.92 8.08 -23.25 34.78
GDP growth 49 3.79 2.23 0.30 11.56
Log GNP 49 11.73 1.58 8.49 15.67
Inflation 47 65.49 363.73 0.27 2502.50
Government
surplus (% GDP)
42 -3.26 5.43 -15.60 15.70
Rule of law 49 6.85 2.63 1.90 10.00
Creditor rights 47 2.30 1.37 0.00 4.00
                                                       
8 “Under the terms of Article 2 of the [OECD] Convention, OECD countries undertake to ensure growth


















Debt/GNP 0.69 0.46 -2.60 0.31 0.65 4.23
Non-performing
loans/total loans




1.02 1.81 1.75 3.04 0.97 -2.75
Real interest rate 6.67 7.16 0.19 12.98 5.63 -1.38
GDP growth 2.84 4.62 3.16 3.12 3.93 1.56
Log GNP 12.69 10.87 -4.86 11.15 11.85 1.37
Inflation 7.39 121.15 1.10 300.54 9.81 -1.06
Government
surplus (% GDP)
-5.60 -0.91 3.07 -1.01 -3.71 -1.86
Rule of law 8.91 5.01 -7.85 5.18 7.22 2.80
Creditor rights 1.73 2.83 2.99 1.25 2.51 2.37
Table 4b reveals a number of interesting results. OECD economies have
significantly wider debt markets and lower default rates (measured by the ratio of provisions
for loan losses to total loans) than non-OECD economies. However, although on average,
the OECD countries have lower (real) interest rates, this difference is not statistically
significant. These differences may be explained in part because OECD countries enjoy safer
and sounder macroeconomic policies. But OECD economies also have a substantial (and
statistically significant) higher index of law and order than their non-OECD counterparts.
(The variable rule of law equals 8.91 for OECD countries and 5.01 for non-OECD
countries.) This may well explain why OECD countries have better access to debt finance.
Interestingly, OECD countries have a lower creditor rights index than non-OECD countries.
This difference, which is highly significant, is at odds with the orthodox claim that a better
protection of creditor rights increases the availability of credit.
Focusing our attention in Latin American countries, we find that they have narrower
debt markets and higher default rates (again measured by the ratio of provisions for loan
losses to total loans) than the other countries in our sample. They also have a lower index of24
legal enforcement and, supporting the orthodox view discussed in previous sections, a lower
index of creditor rights protection. Yet, if we look at these figures for the nine Latin
American countries included in our sample, we observe that, whereas there is a significant
positive correlation between the Debt/GNP ratio and the variable rule of law, the Debt/GNP
ratio is not significantly correlated with our measure of creditor rights protection. This again
casts some doubts on the validity of the orthodox view of creditor rights. The Latin
American puzzle may be resolved in part by considering the macroeconomic context.
Indeed, for Latin America, there seems to be a positive association between low inflation
and large and positive government surpluses and wider debt markets. (For the Latin
American countries in the sample, the correlations between inflation and the Debt/GNP
ratio
9 and between government surplus and the ratio Debt/GNP are equal to –0.56 and 0.42,
respectively.)
Table 5 confirms our impressions so far and indicates the absence of severe
multicolinearity problems in our sample. A more systematic analysis of our evidence





































Real interest rate -0.2163 0.2563 -0.1562 1
(0.2121) (0.3046) (0.3701)
GDP Growth 0.1425 0.0591 -0.1480 -0.0333 1
(0.3743) (0.7990) (0.3496) (0.8385)
Log GNP 0.4871 -0.1252 -0.1373 -0.1553 -0.0066 1
(0.0012) (0.5887) (0.3858) (0.3385) (0.9641)
Inflation -0.1241 0.1536 0.2544 -0.1339 0.0446 0.1078 1
(0.4455) (0.5063) (0.1132) (0.4100) (0.7660) (0.4706)
Government surplus
(% GDP)
0.1262 -0.0446 -0.0387 0.0126 0.1348 -0.1525 -0.0179 1
(0.4440) (0.8519) (0.8203) (0.9418) (0.3945) (0.3349) (0.9115)
Rule of  law 0.5711 -0.3678 -0.3123 -0.0649 -0.1956 0.5638 -0.0519 -0.1480 1
(0.0001) (0.1009) (0.0441) (0.6906) (0.1781) (0.0000) (0.7291) (0.3495)
Creditor rights 0.2693 -0.3600 -0.1993 -0.2799 0.3923 -0.3086 -0.1354 0.1319 -0.1780 1
(0.0973) (0.1190) (0.2176) (0.0888) (0.0064) (0.0348) (0.375) (0.4173) (0.2314)
Note: p-values are shown
in parentheses.
                                                       
9 To calculate the correlation coefficient between inflation and the Debt/GNP ratio, we excluded Brazil
from the sample because its inflation rate in this year was several standard deviations away from the
sample mean.25
4.3. Regression Analysis
Tables 6-10 present ordinary least square regressions (with robust standard errors) of private
debt financing, default rates and real interest rates on several macroeconomic controls, a
measure of the legal protection of creditor rights, and an index of the quality of legal
enforcement and respect for the law.
10
A. Creditor Rights and Debt Finance
Table 6 presents our regression results for the Debt/GNP ratio. The regressions reported in
this  table include all countries in our original sample for which data on all variables
employed in the analysis was available.
Table 6
Debt/GNP OLS regressions. Total sample



























 a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 
c Significant at 10%.
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
                                                       
10 In Table 10 we also show weighted least squares results for our default rates regressions.26
The first column in Table 6 reproduces the first regression in Table VII of La Porta et al.
(1997).
11 They find a positive relationship between the aggregate measure of indebtedness
and both GDP growth and the log of GNP. Most importantly, they also find a positive and
statistically significant association between debt finance and the variables describing the
legal institutions in place: rule of law and creditor rights. The effect of rule of law is large
and robust to alternative specifications indicating legal origin dummies (see Section 3
above). This is not the case for the creditor rights index, which loses significance when
those legal origin dummies are introduced.
The second column in Table 6 presents an alternative specification where two
additional macroeconomic controls are included: inflation and size of the government fiscal
surplus. Both have the expected signs, but only inflation has a statistically significant effect.
Our regression results indicate that a higher inflation rate and a lower (larger) government
surplus (deficit) limit private sector access to debt finance. The introduction of these new
controls does not affect much the size and statistical significance of the rule of law variable.
However, the creditor rights index loses its significance under the new specification. The
correlation between the creditor rights index and both of our new macroeconomic controls
is low and not significant (see Table 5 above). Therefore, the loss of significance of the
creditor rights variable cannot be explained simply by  multicolinearity. We have also
attempted another specification where the creditor rights variable and the variable rule of
law are interacted to check whether a stricter protection of creditor rights has differential
effects in countries with disparate law and order traditions. This interaction term turned out
to be non-significant, which further confirms our previous results on the irrelevance of
creditor rights for debt volume.
12
Table 7
Debt/GNP OLS regressions. OECD vs. Non OECD countries
Independent variables Dependent variable: debt/GNP
OECD countries Non OECD
countries













Rule of law 0.0108 0.1210
a
(0.0385) (0.0230)
                                                       
11 The differences in the point estimates between La Porta et al. and our regression are minimal and may
be due to differences in the use of decimals. The different values of the standard errors may arise
because we employ a robust regression framework, which is appropriate given potential
heteroskedasticity. In any case, the qualitative results are identical.
12 The regression including the interaction between the creditor right index and the rule of law variable
can be obtained from the authors upon request.27
Table 7, continued








 a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 
c Significant at 10%.
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Table 7 presents the results of OLS regressions like that in the second column of
Table 6 for different subdivisions of our overall sample. In the first column, we report our
results for the subsample of OECD countries. We find that whereas our macroeconomic
controls -- inflation and budget surplus -- are both significant and have the theoretically
expected signs, the effects of the legal variables, rule of law and creditor rights, are not
statistically significant. In the second column, we focus our attention on the non-OECD
countries of our sample. We find results that are qualitatively identical to those for the
whole sample: among the two legal indicators, only rule of law has a large and significant
impact on indebtedness.
Finally, Table 8 presents the results of our regression for Latin American countries
only. Here, we have dropped inflation and government surplus as explanatory variables, due
to lack of enough degrees of freedom. The number of observations is very small, which tells
us that these results should be taken with great caution. Yet, this regression, which
incorporates the same explanatory variables as the first column in Table 6, provides an
interesting result: a higher creditor rights index leads to a lower Debt/GNP ratio. This is a
puzzling result from an orthodox viewpoint, although it is consistent with some of the
(critical) views reported in Section 2.2. Due to our limited sample size for Latin America,
we only report simple regression results for our macroeconomic policy controls: inflation
and budget surplus. In both cases, we obtain the expected signs: inflation is negatively
associated with the Debt/GNP ratio,
13 whereas the relationship between this ratio and
government surplus is positive. However, only inflation seems to have a statistically
significant effect on the size of the debt market.
                                                       
13 Again, we exclude Brazil from this regression for the reasons outlined in footnote 8.28
Table 8
Debt/GNP OLS regressions. Latin American countries




















 a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 
c Significant at 10%.
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
In sum, the results of this section suggest that the availability of external finance for
private firms is significantly greater if (i) inflation is lower and (ii) laws and regulations are
widely respected. Macroeconomic stability and law enforcement are the main determinants
of debt volume. The degree of protection of creditor rights appears to be irrelevant in this
respect.
B. Creditor Rights and the Real Interest Rate
In Table 9 we empirically investigate the determinants of interest rates. To do so, we use the
same explanatory variables employed in the analysis of debt volume. The real interest rate
in each country is influenced by a combination of factors, namely, the country’s monetary
and fiscal policy, its position in the business cycle (which, in turn, determines the demand
for credit), and the structure and conduct of its lending and legal institutions. Our
explanatory variables can be understood as proxies for these determinants of the real interest
rate.29
Table 9
Real interest rate OLS regressions. Total sample






















 a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 
c Significant at 10%.
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Concerning our macroeconomic controls, we find that only the inflation rate has a
statistically significant effect on the real interest rate: a higher inflation rate is associated
with a higher real interest rate. The other macroeconomic variables have the expected signs
but are not statistically significant.  Overall, our regression results confirm the standard view
that higher real interest rates indicate a rapidly expanding economy, high budget deficits and
a tight monetary policy.
Our results additionally show that the real interest rate is also significantly related to
our legal variables. A higher value of the creditor rights index is associated with a lower
interest rate. This sign is consistent with both orthodox and critical theories presented in
Section 2 and, therefore, it does not allow us to discriminate among them. Surprisingly, the
relationship between our rule of law variable and the real interest rate is positive and
significant. This is the opposite of what we would have expected. We have no proper
explanation for this awkward result. Indeed, from Table 5, we have assumed that both
variables are negatively, though non-significantly, correlated. This result remains a puzzle
that requires further research.30
C. Creditor Rights and Defaults
We finally consider the empirical determinants of the default rate in each country. As we
explained above, we use two variables as proxies for the default rate: the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans in each country and the ratio of provisions for loan losses to
total loans. In the first two columns of Table 10, we present our regression results for the
frequency of non-performing loans. The first column presents ordinary least squares
regression results, whereas the second column shows the same regression estimated this
time by weighted least squares, using as weights the number of banks for which IBCA
reports non-performing loans. In principle, using weighted least squares should yield better
results, given that the number of banks available to compute the country averages differs
markedly across countries. However, given that we do not know the total number of banks
per country, the weights employed may not appropriately capture the actual statistical
significance of the various country averages.
Table 10
Default rate regressions. Total sample
Independent variables Dependent variable:
non-performing loans/total loans
Dependent variable:













(0.3871) (0.5945) (0.1263) (0.1054)
Log GNP -0.1333 -0.8351
b 0.0064 0.0178
(0.2736) (0.3195) (0.1231) (0.0737)
Inflation 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0009
a 0.0009
a





(0.1303) (0.1026) (0.0383) (0.0286)
Rule of law -0.4008
b -0.1558 -0.1542 -0.2620
b
(0.1817) (0.3002) (0.1018) (0.1000)
Creditor rights -0.9352 -2.3234
b -0.0292 0.0054





(2.9521) (3.2864) (1.3665) (1.1418)
Number of observations 19 19 34 34
Adjusted R
2 0.0702 0.6771 0.1871 0.6275
Notes:
 a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 
c Significant at 10%.
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Regression in second column is weighted by the number of banks used to compute non-
performing loans in each country. Regression in fourth column is weighted by the number of banks used to compute provisions for loan
losses in each country.31
We find that the ratio of non-performing loans is higher for expanding economies.
This may be explained because, as noted by Gavin and  Hausmann (1996), buoyant
economic growth often leads to lending booms in which the underlying quality of the
funded projects is not properly assessed by lenders. This ratio is also higher for countries
with lax fiscal policies. Focusing on our legal indicators, our results are different for the two
estimation methods. Using ordinary least squares, we find that a higher value of the rule of
law index is associated with a lower incidence of non-performing loans. This relationship is
significant at the 5% level. In contrast, a stricter protection of creditor rights does not seem
to have a significant effect on this ratio. On the other hand, when we use weighted least
squares, we obtain exactly the opposite picture: creditor rights have a negative and highly
significant impact on the ratio of non-performing loans, while rule of law appears to be
statistically irrelevant.
 The number of observations for the frequency of non-performing loans is quite
small. This might explain the ambiguity regarding the legal determinants of default rates. In
the second pair of columns in Table 10, we repeat our analysis using a different proxy for
the default rate: the ratio of provisions for loan losses to total loans. We have a larger
number of observations for this variable which, on the other hand, is a conceptually worse
proxy for the default rate (see footnote 6 above). Roughly speaking, when we estimate this
regression by ordinary least squares, we find the same signs as in the previous two columns,
although now only inflation has a statistically significant impact on defaults. Higher
inflation translates into a larger ratio of provisions for loan losses to total loans. None of our
legal indicators is significant in this regression. Our weighted least square results confirm
the statistical significance of inflation. But in this last regression, the default rate is also
significantly related to the tightness of fiscal policy and the rule of law. A lax fiscal policy
increases this ratio, which is in turn lower in countries with a better law and order tradition.
In both regressions, however, the exact protection awarded to creditor rights appears to be
of no importance for the determination of this ratio.
4.4. Implications for the Theoretical Debate
How can we reconcile our empirical findings with the theories described in Section 2?
Table 1’ expands Table 1 to incorporate our regression results on the impact of a stricter
protection of creditor rights on lending volumes, interest rates and default rates. From Table
1’, it should be clear that our empirical analysis does not allow us to fully discriminate
between the orthodox views and the critical theories presented in Sections 2.1 and 2.2,
respectively. If anything, our results suggest that elements of both theories seem to be
needed to understand the credit market.
As predicted by both sets of theories, a stricter protection of creditor rights
significantly reduces the cost of external finance. In contrast, strengthening the protection
awarded to creditors has no significant effect on lending volume. This result is consistent
with what we have denoted as critical theories, which emphasize both the ex ante benefits
and costs of protecting creditor rights, but it contradicts the orthodox view on this issue as
well as previous results by La Porta et al. (1997).
Our regression results do not present a clear-cut picture regarding default rates. In
three of our four different regressions on default rates, creditor rights protection had no
significant impact on the incidence of default. Only in one of these exercises did a stricter
protection of creditor rights lead to a statistically significant lower proportion of defaults.
The orthodox view on the efficiency implications of protecting creditor rights argues that a32
stricter protection of creditor rights should unambiguously lead to fewer defaults by solving
several adverse selection and moral hazard problems on the side of borrowers.  The exactly
opposite stance is taken by many other authors, who note the importance of moral hazard
among lenders. In practice, credit markets may be subject to both types of information
asymmetries and non-contractibility problems, which may explain our ambiguous findings.
Table 1’
The impact of a stricter protection of creditor rights: theory and evidence
Lending volume Interest rates Default rates
Orthodox view › ﬂ ﬂ
Critical theories ›ﬂ ﬂ ›
Our evidence ˘ ﬂ ?
These inconclusive results can be reasonably interpreted as suggestive of the
practical irrelevance of the degree of protection awarded to creditors. The efficiency of
judicial enforcement, as well as the stability of the macroeconomic scenario where firms
operate, appear to have more significant effects on credit markets. Yet, further empirical
investigations are needed to reach more definitive conclusions. For instance, it would be
desirable to control for differences in the degree of competitiveness of credit markets
around the world, using proxies of the structure and conduct of financial intermediaries in
various countries. Most importantly, it seems crucial to develop a data panel -- enlarging the
current data set along its time dimension -- in order to control for possible fixed effects and
obvious endogeneity problems, which may distort our current estimates.
 5. Conclusions and Policy Implications
In this paper, we have reviewed the existing theories on the efficiency implications of the
various regulations that protect the rights of creditors. We have investigated, for a sample of
49 counties developed by La Porta et al. (1998), the impact on debt volume, interest rates
and default rates of a stricter protection of creditor rights and a more efficient judicial
system. Our results confirm previous analysis by La Porta et al. (1997) showing that an
effective judicial system constitutes an essential prerequisite for the development and
optimal performance of the credit market. Yet, in contrast to these studies, we find no
conclusive evidence on the sign and magnitude of the effect of creditor rights on credit
market efficiency. Most importantly, we have also uncovered that macroeconomic
developments do significantly contribute to credit market efficiency. In particular, countries
with high inflation have narrower debt markets.
Focusing on Latin America, we concur with La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1998)
in that it “offers investors a rather unattractive legal environment.” We also agree with them
in that reforms in Latin America tending to improve the efficiency of judicial enforcement33
are crucial. But we disagree on the need of enhancing creditor rights in Latin America. Our
regression results show that this policy recommendation is, at best, unwarranted. Instead,
we find that a more stable macroeconomic framework seems crucial for the development of
well-functioning debt markets.
To illustrate these last claims, let us compare the cases of Chile, Mexico, and
Uruguay using our 1994 data. Chile and Uruguay both had a creditor rights index equal to
2. Mexico, instead, had an index of creditor rights protection equal to 0. Chile had a higher
debt/GNP ratio than Mexico (0.63 in Chile and 0.47 in Mexico). But Mexico, in turn, had a
higher debt/GNP ratio than Uruguay (this ratio is 0.26 in Uruguay). Our measures of legal
enforcement and macroeconomic policy variables, such as inflation and government
surplus/deficit, better explain these credit market ratios. Indeed, Chile’s rule of law index
exceeds Mexico’s, which is larger than the corresponding value for Uruguay (7.02, 5.35 and
5, respectively. In 1994, inflation in Mexico (6.95 %) was lower than in Uruguay (44.75%).
In this year, Chile sustained a surplus of 1.7% of GNP, whereas Uruguay had a budget
deficit equal to 3% of GNP.
In this paper, we have treated a country’s legal code and law enforcement tradition
as exogenous. In a recent and thought-provoking paper,  Svensson (1998), given the
importance of adequate legal institutions for economic development, asks the question:
“why does not a rational, forward-looking government choose to reform the legal code, or
alternatively invest in legal infrastructures?” The answer provided by Svensson (1998), in
the spirit of North (1981), is based on rent seeking and lobbying by interest groups.
Svensson’s theory constitutes an interesting, though partial, answer to his question, which
definitively requires further consideration.34
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Table 1
The impact of a stricter protection of creditor rights
Lending volume Interest rates Default rates
Orthodox view › ﬂ ﬂ
Critical theories ›ﬂ ﬂ ›
Table 2
Description of the variables
Debt/GNP Ratio of the sum of bank debt of the private sector
and outstanding non-financial bonds to GNP in
1994, or last available. Source: La Porta  et al.
(1997).
Non-performing loans/total loans Ratio of total non-performing loans to total loans in
each country (1994-95 country average). This
variable is based on the  BankScope bank-level
data set by IBCA. Source: Jappelli and Pagano
(1998).
Bank provisions for loan losses/total loans Ratio of bank provisions for loan losses to total
loans in each country (1994-95 country average).
This variable is based on the  BankScope bank-
level data set produced by IBCA. Source: Jappelli
and Pagano (1998).
Real interest rate Real lending rate charged by the banks on loans to
prime customers in 1994. Inflation in 1994
(consumer price index) is used to compute real
interest rate. Source: The World Bank,  World
Development Report 1996  and United Nations,
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, XLIX, 1995.
GDP growth Average annual percent growth of per capita gross
domestic product for the period 1970-1993.
Source: La Porta et al. (1997).
Log GNP Logarithm of the Gross National Product in 1994.
Source: La Porta et al. (1997).
Inflation Inflation in 1994 (consumer price index). Source:
United Nations,  Monthly Bulletin of Statistics,
XLIX, 1995.38
Table 2
Description of the variables (continued)
Government surplus (% GDP) Ratio of current and capital revenue and official
grants received, less total expenditure and lending
minus repayments to Gross Domestic Product in
1994. Source: The World Bank,  World
Development Report 1996.
Rule of law Assessment of the law and order tradition in the
country. Average of the months of April and
October of the monthly index between 1982 and
1995. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores for less
tradition for law and order. La Porta et al. (1997).
Creditor rights An index aggregating creditor rights. The index is
formed by adding 1 when: (1) the country imposes
restrictions, such as creditors’ consent or minimum
dividends, to file for reorganization; (2) secured
creditors are able to gain possession of their
security once the reorganization petition has been
approved (no automatic stay); (3) the debtor does
not retain the administration of its property pending
the resolution of the reorganization; (4) secured
creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the
proceeds that result from the disposition of the
assets of a bankrupt firm. The index ranges from 0






























Australia 0.76 3.7 0.34 9.92 3.06 12.64 1.89 -2.9 10 1
Austria 0.79 (na) 0.9 (na) 2.74 12.13 3.05 -5.1 10 3
Belgium 0.38 (na) 0.26 6.84 2.46 12.29 2.4 -6.1 10 2
Canada 0.72 2.34 0.79 6.61 3.36 13.26 0.27 -4.5 10 1
Denmark 0.34 (na) 1.37 6.2 2.09 11.84 1.98 -5.7 10 3
Finland 0.75 3.3 2.51 6.74 2.4 11.49 1.09 -14.1 10 1
France 0.96 8.81 0.95 6.13 2.54 14.07 1.67 -5.5 8.98 0
Germany 1.12 (na) 0.6 8.54 2.6 14.46 2.73 -2.5 9.23 3
Greece 0.23 (na) 1.2 14.86 2.46 11.25 10.92 -15.6 6.18 1
Ireland 0.38 (na) (na) 3.7 4.25 10.73 2.31 -2.3 7.8 1
Italy 0.55 5.21 1.74 6.89 2.82 13.94 4.03 -10.6 8.33 2
Japan 1.22 1.66 0.53 3.42 4.13 15.18 0.66 -1.6 8.98 2
Mexico 
* 0.47 7.09 2.89 (na) 3.07 12.69 6.95 (na) 5.35 0
Netherlands 1.08 (na) 0.05 5.4 2.55 12.68 2.75 -0.5 10 2
New Zealand 0.9 (na) (na) 7.86 1.67 10.69 1.71 0.8 10 3
Norway 0.64 4.6 -0.06 6.91 3.43 11.62 1.39 -7.5 10 2
Portugal 0.64 5.56 1.56 9.25 3.52 11.41 5.26 -2.2 8.68 1
Spain 0.75 4.74 0.98 3.94 3.27 13.19 4.77 -4.8 7.8 2
Sweden 0.55 7.02 1.12 8.2 1.79 12.28 2.22 -13.4 10 2
Switzerland (na) (na) 0.75 4.58 1.18 12.44 0.88 (na) 10 1
Turkey 0.15 6.11 2.26 (na) 5.05 12.08 106.27 -4 5.18 2
UK 1.13 (na) 0.16 3.01 2.27 13.86 2.42 -6.6 8.57 4
US 0.81 1.65 0.56 4.46 2.74 15.67 2.53 -3 10 1
Non OECD countries
Argentina 
* 0.19 (na) 3.79 5.68 1.4 12.4 4.18 (na) 5.35 1
Brazil 
* 0.39 6.31 3.63 (na) 3.95 13.03 2502.5 -4 6.32 1
Chile 
* 0.63 0.93 0.34 7.97 3.35 10.69 11.42 1.7 7.02 2
Colombia 
* 0.19 7.34 1.74 14.03 4.38 10.82 23.21 -0.6 2.08 0
Ecuador 
* (na) 4.64 1.99 13.09 4.55 9.49 27.33 0 6.67 4
Egypt (na) (na) 2.63 7.74 6.13 10.53 8.13 2.1 4.17 4
Hong Kong (na) (na) 0.28 (na) 7.57 11.56 8.08 (na) 8.22 4
India 0.29 (na) 3.87 5.41 4.34 12.5 10.33 -6 4.17 4
Indonesia 0.42 (na) 0.84 10.83 6.38 11.84 8.45 0.6 3.98 4
Israel 0.66 (na) 0.85 4.47 4.39 11.19 12.38 -3 4.82 4
Jordan 0.7 5.54 0.86 6.64 1.2 8.49 2.21 1.9 4.35 (na)
Kenya (na) (na) (na) (na) 4.79 8.83 29.04 -3.6 5.42 4
Malaysia 0.84 (na) 0.63 3.75 6.9 11 3.71 4.1 6.78 4
Nigeria (na) (na) (na) -23.25 3.43 10.36 57.01 (na) 2.73 4
Pakistan 0.27 (na) (na) (na) 5.5 10.88 12.47 -6.9 3.03 4
Peru 
* 0.27 8.93 3.45 24.14 2.82 10.92 23.73 3.1 2.5 0
Philippines 0.1 3.05 0.38 5.54 0.3 10.44 9.06 -1.4 2.73 0
Singapore 0.6 (na) (na) 2.31 1.68 11.68 3.51 15.7 8.57 3
South Africa 0.93 (na) 0.73 6.1 7.48 10.92 8.95 -9.2 4.42 4
South Korea 0.74 (na) 0.79 (na) 9.52 12.73 (na) 0.3 5.35 3
Sri Lanka 0.25 (na) 0.83 4.2 4.04 9.28 8.45 -8.7 1.9 340
Taiwan (na) (na) 0.32 (na) 11.56 12.34 (na) (na) 8.52 2
Thailand 0.93 (na) 0.49 8.28 7.7 11.72 5.65 1.9 6.25 3
Uruguay 
* 0.26 3.52 1.47 34.78 1.96 9.4 44.75 -3 5 2
Venezuela 
* 0.1 (na) 8.11 -8.85 2.65 10.99 60.84 -4.3 6.37 (na)
Zimbabwe (na) (na) (na) 10.33 2.17 8.63 22.27 (na) 3.68 4
Notes: 


















Australia 3.7 12 0.34 34
Austria (na) (na) 0.9 71
Belgium (na) (na) 0.26 76
Canada 2.34 7 0.79 17
Denmark (na) (na) 1.37 84
Finland 3.3 6 2.51 8
France 8.81 125 0.95 336
Germany (na) (na) 0.6 1597
Greece (na) (na) 1.2 18
Ireland (na) (na) (na) (na)
Italy 5.21 236 1.74 250
Japan 1.66 108 0.53 120
Mexico 
* 7.09 22 2.89 22
Netherlands (na) (na) 0.05 24
New Zealand (na) (na) (na) (na)
Norway 4.6 21 -0.06 30
Portugal 5.56 13 1.56 31
Spain 4.74 19 0.98 163
Sweden 7.02 15 1.12 16
Switzerland (na) (na) 0.75 87
Turkey 6.11 25 2.26 27
UK (na) (na) 0.16 59
US 1.65 495 0.56 497
Non OECD countries
Argentina 
* (na) (na) 3.79 97
Brazil 
* 6.31 94 3.63 95
Chile 
* 0.93 29 0.34 31
Colombia 
* 7.34 24 1.74 27
Ecuador 
* 4.64 25 1.99 24
Egypt (na) (na) 2.63 21
Hong Kong (na) (na) 0.28 5
India (na) (na) 3.87 63
Indonesia (na) (na) 0.84 46
Israel (na) (na) 0.85 16
Jordan 5.54 6 0.86 9
Kenya (na) (na) (na) (na)
Malaysia (na) (na) 0.63 31
Nigeria (na) (na) (na) (na)




* 8.93 23 3.45 18
Philippines 3.05 8 0.38 13
Singapore (na) (na) (na) (na)
South Africa (na) (na) 0.73 6
South Korea (na) (na) 0.79 13
Sri Lanka (na) (na) 0.83 6
Taiwan (na) (na) 0.32 33
Thailand (na) (na) 0.49 17
Uruguay 
* 3.52 5 1.47 7
Venezuela 
* (na) (na) 8.11 15
Zimbabwe (na) (na) (na) (na)
Notes: 








Debt/GNP 41 0.59 0.31 0.10 1.22
Non-performing
loans/total loans
21 4.86 2.28 0.93 8.93
Bank provisions for loan
losses/total loans
42 1.42 1.50 -0.06 8.11
Real interest rate 40 6.92 8.08 -23.25 34.78
GDP growth 49 3.79 2.23 0.30 11.56
Log GNP 49 11.73 1.58 8.49 15.67
Inflation 47 65.49 363.73 0.27 2502.50
Government
surplus (% GDP)
42 -3.26 5.43 -15.60 15.70
Rule of law 49 6.85 2.63 1.90 10.00


















Debt/GNP 0.69 0.46 -2.60 0.31 0.65 4.23
Non-performing
loans/total loans
4.75 5.03 0.26 5.53 4.52 -0.88
Bank provisions for loan
losses/total loans
1.02 1.81 1.75 3.04 0.97 -2.75
Real interest rate 6.67 7.16 0.19 12.98 5.63 -1.38
GDP growth 2.84 4.62 3.16 3.12 3.93 1.56
Log GNP 12.69 10.87 -4.86 11.15 11.85 1.37
Inflation 7.39 121.15 1.10 300.54 9.81 -1.06
Government
surplus (% GDP)
-5.60 -0.91 3.07 -1.01 -3.71 -1.86
Rule of law 8.91 5.01 -7.85 5.18 7.22 2.80


































Real interest rate -0.2163 0.2563 -0.1562 1
(0.2121) (0.3046) (0.3701)
GDP Growth 0.1425 0.0591 -0.1480 -0.0333 1
(0.3743) (0.7990) (0.3496) (0.8385)
Log GNP 0.4871 -0.1252 -0.1373 -0.1553 -0.0066 1
(0.0012) (0.5887) (0.3858) (0.3385) (0.9641)
Inflation -0.1241 0.1536 0.2544 -0.1339 0.0446 0.1078 1
(0.4455) (0.5063) (0.1132) (0.4100) (0.7660) (0.4706)
Government surplus
(% GDP)
0.1262 -0.0446 -0.0387 0.0126 0.1348 -0.1525 -0.0179 1
(0.4440) (0.8519) (0.8203) (0.9418) (0.3945) (0.3349) (0.9115
)
Rule of  law 0.5711 -0.3678 -0.3123 -0.0649 -0.1956 0.5638 -0.0519 -0.1480 1
(0.0001) (0.1009) (0.0441) (0.6906) (0.1781) (0.0000) (0.7291
)
(0.3495)
Creditor rights 0.2693 -0.3600 -0.1993 -0.2799 0.3923 -0.3086 -0.1354 0.1319 -0.1780 1
(0.0973) (0.1190) (0.2176) (0.0888) (0.0064) (0.0348) (0.375) (0.4173) (0.2314)
Note: p-values are shown
in parentheses.44
Table 6
Debt/GNP OLS regressions. Total sample



























 a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 
c Significant at 10%.
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.45
Table 7
Debt/GNP OLS regressions. OECD vs. Non OECD countries
Independent variables Dependent variable: debt/GNP
OECD countries Non OECD
countries













Rule of law 0.0108 0.1210
a
(0.0385) (0.0230)








 a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 
c Significant at 10%.
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.46
Table 8
Debt/GNP OLS regressions. Latin American countries




















 a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 
c Significant at 10%.
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
.47
Table 9
Real interest rate OLS regressions. Total sample






















 a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 
c Significant at 10%.
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.48
Table 10
Default rate regressions. Total sample
Independent variables Dependent variable:
non-performing loans/total loans
Dependent variable:













(0.3871) (0.5945) (0.1263) (0.1054)
Log GNP -0.1333 -0.8351
b 0.0064 0.0178
(0.2736) (0.3195) (0.1231) (0.0737)
Inflation 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0009
a 0.0009
a





(0.1303) (0.1026) (0.0383) (0.0286)
Rule of law -0.4008
b -0.1558 -0.1542 -0.2620
b
(0.1817) (0.3002) (0.1018) (0.1000)
Creditor rights -0.9352 -2.3234
b -0.0292 0.0054





(2.9521) (3.2864) (1.3665) (1.1418)
Number of observations 19 19 34 34
Adjusted R
2 0.0702 0.6771 0.1871 0.6275
Notes:
 a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 
c Significant at 10%.
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Regression in second column is weighted by the number of banks used to compute non-
performing loans in each country. Regression in fourth column is weighted by the number of banks used to compute provisions for loan
losses in each country.49
Table 1’
The impact of a stricter protection of creditor rights: theory and evidence
Lending volume Interest rates Default rates
Orthodox view › ﬂ ﬂ
Critical theories ›ﬂ ﬂ ›
Our evidence ˘ ﬂ ?